Chaos kontrolowany: stycznia 2008

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by D.W.G.

What underlies our understanding of concepts of word meaning? How do we determine the meaning of some certain objects which belong to the same class, even though they vary in shape, sometimes even having totally atypical form, but still they are seen as members of the same artifact kind?

Previous theories like Prototype theory showed that the shape of an object does not have a major influence on the difference between membership of the same kind. E.g. A clock generally has a round shape, but what about duck-shaped clocks? These objects are still seen as clocks even though the shape is not consistent with the exemplar.

If the shape is not so relevant, what about the function of the object? Are the functional properties crucial in determining the word meaning?

The functional-based experiments brought important results showing that the function is neither relevant nor sufficient in determining the artifact concept. If people classify a boat as an object that has a function to carry or to suspend objects above the water and in this sense the difference is marked, what about life preservers, cruisers, or rafts? The function-based proposal posits that the functional features determines the class of objects, thus the shape has the major role in differentiating among the members of that particular class. If this view is true, what about objects that have a proper shape but no function at all e.g a ship in a bottle?

In other words, people can create objects without the intention to use them at all.

Membership of an artifact kind does not only concern 3D objects, but also 2D pictures of those objects.

Members of the particular society posses a kind of intuition to distinguish between the two pictures that represent two objects that belong to the different artifact kinds. How do people distinguish between e.g a picture of a dog and a picture of a cat? This knowledge must be a result of the entirely different intention to represent different things. We know that the pictures of an X are those and only those pictures created with the obvious intention to represent an X.

However, the difficulty arises when we have to deal with a representation of something which does not look like an X, nevertheless represents an X.

Solution to this problem can give Levinson's theory of art in general.

According to Levinson two modes of art making can be distinguished: An intrinsical mode of art-making as well as the relational mode of art-making. The former one implies that any object can be seen as a piece of art if it holds the correct appearance that is usually connected with art. The latter mode implies that any odd entity can be seen as a piece of art if and only if it was created with the right intention to be art.

In other words: any daub can be seen as a piece of art as long as it has come into existence with the particular intention to be a piece of art

Another point of Levinson's theory, as crucial as the one mentioned above in determining the word meaning, is as follows:

The art of a given period can be based on the prior art.

As the history shows: what was seen in the past as an odd entity, has become with time, truly acknowledged art e.g. Impressionists' works were seen as odd daubs in the past, but now Impressionistic style is seen as a standard in art.

Having explained the bases, a major proposal can be formulated.

Bloom's proposal based on the Levinson's Intentional-Historical Theory is as follows:

“We infer that a novel entity has been successfully created with the intention to be a member of an artifact kind - if its current appearance and potential use are best explained as resulting from the intention to create a member of an artifact kind”[Bloom, 1996, p.12].

Rephrasing this we can say that our understanding of the concept of e.g. “chair” is that, this concept includes all and only those entities that have been effectively created with the intention to belong to the same kind as current and previous chairs.

If a person was learning a second language and was exposed to a new entity, that was described as “a chair”, then this person associates this object as a member of an artifact kind.

Being later exposed to new entities which are similar in shape and function to the “prototype” chair, the person could infer that those objects also belong to the the same domain, thus it's an excellent clue that this item was intentionally brought into existence with a particular goal to be a member of an artifact kind.

Intentional-Historical theory predicts that the intentions and activities of the creator must be relevant in the act of determining the membership of the artifact kind.

Bloom's proposal also brings an explanation about the order of features(shape>texture>size>colour> of an item, needed for classification membership of an artifact kind. People own some kind of intuitions about the features of an object, which are based on people's inferences as to which features exist as the result of the intention to construct a member of a specific artifact kind.

A novel entity and a previous member of the kind will have some similarities which are not accidental. In other words, if something does not look like a member of an artifact kind, it probably has not been created with the intention to be a member of the kind.

On the other hand, shape cannot be a major property for the categorization, due to the fact that people have no problems in categorizing a duck-shaped clock as a member of the clock domain.

In this way intention as an underlying notion can help to explain the “fuzzy boundaries” that the Prototype theory had problem with.

People are more likely to classify an atypical member of an artifact kind as a true member of this kind if they think of a possibility that this object was created with the intention to be a member of that particular domain.

E.g. We still see the credit-card shaped objects used in hotels as keys even though they do not posses the typical shape that the exemplars of this domain have.

Those plastic strips are seen as keys due to the intentions of the creator, as well as the historical continuity.

Furthermore, modern electric bulbs are another crucial example as far as the “improvement” is concerned.

We see modern bulbs as bulbs even though they have an oval or a cylindrical shape. The categorization is heavily based on the intention of the creator, who wanted to create a member of an artifact kind. The more futuristic version of the artifact kind, or the more useful that article is, then the possibility to classify that item as a member of an artifact kind is indubitably very high.

The Intentional-Historical theory is very relevant in providing the the factors under which the particular member of an artifact kind stops being a member of the domain.

If a clock breaks down, but still remains its shape i.e. The shape of a clock, we will still see it as a clock. It does not matter that this object cannot be fixed. This broken clock will remain the member of an artifact kind, because it came into existence as a member of that kind.

On the other hand we can transform one object to be a substitute for the other one.

These transformations can be done in two ways:

As a part of physical manipulation i.e. When we change the physical properties of the object e.g. A jar can be transformed into a bird-feeder, and thus that item will be seen as a bird-feeder and not as the jar any more.

In whatever way, this process of the physical manipulation is not as powerful as,the case when someone uses their intentions. E.g. Somebody can use the bottle cap as a pawn, when a part of the chess board is lost. The shape of the bottle cap stays the same but that simple crown cap obtains the ability to function as the pawn.

Furthermore, certain artifacts can be easily created out of members of different artifact kinds or even sometimes from natural kinds e.g. Toys, coins, pawns and especially weapons. Particularly any object that belongs to either artifact kind or natural kind can be used with the intention to serve a some kind of weapon. This type of a transformation, which is the result of the intentional acts, is called “transfiguration”.

On the other hand, some criticism of Blooms's view can be evaluated.

The creator's knowledge of a world must be consistent with the knowledge of the other members of the society. E.g. If a madman created a pile of dust, and said that it was a chair, people would not see it as a chair, even though it was created with the intention to be a chair.

It is highly impossible that someone who has a similar knowledge and beliefs about the world as other members of the particular society, would create something that according to him is a member of an artifact kind, but by judgment of the rest of the society definitively is not.

Another sort of criticism deals with the intention as some kind of a prime mover. If a lighting bolt hit a rock and transformed it into a chair, people should not see that object as a chair, because it came into existence without any particular intention to be a member of an artifact kind.

In this case an explanation can be as follows:

We see this rock as a chair because “people can posit that any item can be a member of an artifact kind if it is of the physical structure that would arise as if it was created with the intention to be a member of an artifact kind”[Bloom 1996 p. 21]. This means that we see this rock-chair as a rock, but we have the ability to use it with the intention to serve as a chair. A rock is a rock, unless we can use it with the intention to be an object that is used to sit upon.

This theory at this stage can rise some implications for different theories. These unlikely instances like the one mentioned above can have some impact on the assumptions that some sort of non-human entity could intentionally created those objects.

However this point is the part of the discussion between the followers of the Neo-Darwinian and followers of the Argument from Design theory.

The last thing that should mentioned is that the Bloom's proposal is concerned only with the artifact kinds e.g. Chairs, pawns etc, not with the natural kinds. The difference between the artifact kinds and natural kinds is that the artifact kinds are created through human agency.

Summing up, the Bloom's proposal is heavily based on the notion of the right intention in determining the artifact kind.

Furthermore, Bloom's proposal not only helped to clearly explain the process of determining the word meaning, but also raised some important questions concerning the teleological and chemical theories of the origins of the biological structures.

Bibliography:

“Oxford Concise Dictionary of Linguistics” 2006

P. Bloom “Intention, history, and artifact concepts” 1994

S. Lobner “Understanding Semantics” 1995

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